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Abstract: 
The contribution of this paper is in emphasizing endogenous credit rationing in the 
analysis of effects of bankruptcy rules on entrepeneurs’ decisions with respect to risk-
taking and ex ante skill-development. Unlike most of the literature, both the debt claim 
and the amount of debt financing is endogenous in our exercise.  This allows us to 
determine the extent of credit rationing that banks use to tackle informational asymmetry.  
Credit rationing is non-trivial and increases the cost of capital when corporations are 
forced to access alternative sources of funding even when debt is a cheaper alternative.  
We thus solve for optimal debt-equity ratios in the capital structure of the corporation and 
entrepeneurs’ risk-taking.  Second, we allow entrepeneurs to invest in generating skill to 
handle risky projects.  We show that bankruptcy policies are important determinants of 
all these outcomes in ways that in some cases contradict the existing literature, which 
does not consider endogenous credit rationing. 
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The Impact of Bankruptcy Rules on Risky Project Choice and Skill 
Formation under Credit Rationing  
 
1. Introduction 
The level of managerial skill is usually taken as given in analyses of entrepreneurs’ 
project choices and banks’ lending decisions, while banks’ supply of debt is usually taken 
as given in analyses of risky project choice and managerial skill development.  However, 
entrepreneurs’ investment in managerial skill, their risk taking and the banks’ willingness 
to finance risky projects are more likely to be endogenously determined.  For example, if 
banks’ willingness to finance risky projects increases, it becomes more profitable for 
managers to invest in the skills required to handle risky projects.  On the other hand, 
when managers are more skilled, they may be more willing to take on risky projects. 
Knowing how managers and entrepreneurs behave, banks’ willingness to lend, or the 
conditions under which banks lend, could change.   
           Bank willingness to lend to risky projects is expected to be affected to an 
important extent by the rules that govern the sharing of assets in situations of project 
failure, i.e., under bankruptcy. The contribution of this paper is in emphasizing 
endogenous credit rationing in the analysis of effects of bankruptcy rules on 
entrepreneurs’ decisions. We explicitly investigate the effects on bank behavior, risky 
project choice, and managerial skill development of more or less strict bankruptcy rules. 
By strict rules we mean that absolute priority (APR) among creditors is upheld under 
limited liability of shareholders.    
 2 
 There exists a large literature on the design and incentive effects of financial 
contracts.1  Standard debt contracts are efficient for project financing under a variety of 
circumstances including costly state verification and agency relations --- when outcomes 
or actions relating to the firm cannot be contractually controlled --- and adverse selection 
--- when characteristics of the firm cannot be identified. In this literature it is commonly 
assumed that there is a contractually specified absolute priority among creditors’ claims 
in case of project failure. Under this assumption equity holders do not retain any claim on 
the assets if the debt cannot be serviced. 
        In this paper we assume that banks issue standard debt contracts under conditions of 
non-verifiability of projects’ risk characteristics. We focus on the impact of deviations 
from APR on the ex ante incentives of banks and entrepreneurs who serve as project 
managers. Our paper makes two important additions to the literature on bankruptcy rules.  
One, unlike most of the literature, both the debt claim and the amount of debt financing --
- and therefore also the interest rate on debt --- are endogenous in our exercise.  Thereby, 
we are able to determine the extent of credit rationing that banks use to tackle the 
informational asymmetry.  Credit rationing is non-trivial when firms are forced to access 
alternative sources of funding even when debt is a cheaper alternative.  We thus solve for 
optimal debt-equity ratios in the capital structure of the firm.  Second, we allow 
entrepreneurs to invest in generating skill to handle risky projects.  We show that 
bankruptcy policies are important determinants of the supply of debt, risky project 
choice, and skill developments in ways that in some cases contradict the existing 
literature, which does not consider endogenous credit rationing.  
                                                
1 See Allen and Winton (1995) and—for a capital structure perspective—Harris and Raviv (1991) 
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Bankruptcy institutions have become the focus of both research and policy debate 
in industrialized countries, as well as in emerging market economies. A large part of the 
economic research has focused on efficiency properties of bankruptcy law, including 
explicit procedures for restructuring that often allow deviations from absolute priority 
(APR) when insolvent firms’ assets or their value are divided up in insolvency 
proceedings. One ex post efficiency issue is whether bankruptcy institutions induce 
restructuring rather than liquidation when it is economically efficient at the time of 
insolvency. White (1995) and Baird (1997) review this literature focusing on effects of 
Chapter 11 of the American bankruptcy code.  
Limited liability has well-known consequences for excessive shareholder risk-
taking.2 Thus, strengthening shareholders’ and managers’ position in insolvency, as ex 
post violation of APR does, may affect efficiency through project choice, managerial skill 
development, as well as lending decisions. These consequences appear “ex ante” at the 
time investment and financing decisions are made. 
Effects of bankruptcy procedures on managers’ and entrepreneurs’ ex ante 
incentives have been analyzed in a number of papers.3 For example, Bebchuk and Picker 
(1993) and Freirman and Viswanath (1994) make the case for deviations from APR on 
the grounds that (excessive) risk-taking is reduced when managers retain a stake in 
bankrupt firms’ assets. Bebchuk and Picker, whose model in many ways is similar to 
ours, also argue that under-investment in specific managerial skill is reduced by 
deviations from APR. Berkovitch and Zender (1998) make a similar argument. 
                                                
2 See, for example, Rose-Ackerman (1991) 
3 See, for example, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Bebchuk and 
Picker (1993), Freirman and Viswanath (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Berkovitch 
and Zender (1998). 
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            Another aspect of ex ante efficiency of bankruptcy rules is discussed in Cornelli 
and Felli (1997). They focus on the incentives of senior and junior creditors to monitor 
borrowers. Neither an APR-rule nor a more debtor friendly rule is ex ante efficient with 
respect to monitoring incentives for all creditors in their analysis.  Monitoring incentives 
would presumably affect creditors’ willingness to supply credit to particular projects as 
well. We assume that monitoring is insufficient to resolve the informational asymmetry 
between the entrepreneur and the creditor.  
One strand, of the literature on bankruptcy institutions, focuses on bankruptcy 
costs and their role in the determination of capital structure (see Altman, 1984). This 
literature rarely addresses the issue of whether alternative rules affect the debt-equity 
structure of firms except through bankruptcy costs. We do not include explicit 
bankruptcy costs but assume that risky assets are firm-specific meaning that there is a 
dead-weight loss of asset value in case of bankruptcy. 
                We proceed by describing the model and its main attributes in Section 2. The 
effects of more or less strict bankruptcy rules (deviations from APR) on risky project 
choice, the value of debt, and credit rationing, are analyzed und er the assumption that the 
entrepreneurs’ skill levels are exogenous in Section 3. The skill levels of entrepreneurs 
are determined endogenously in Section 4. The effects of strictness of bankruptcy rules 
on risky project choice and skill levels are derived. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 5 
2. The Model and its Attributes 
In this section we develop a model including an entrepreneur, a bank, and a large number 
of outside investors.  Each entrepreneur has an identical safe project and the option of 
choosing a risky technology.  All projects (both safe and risky) require investment K .  
The safe project gives a return m .  The risky project gives a return z+m  with probability 
,q  where 0>z  captures managerial skill. With probability q-1  the project gives a 
return 0, >³- bb mm , where b  captures deadweight losses when bankruptcy occurs.  
There are four periods 0,1,2,3.  In period 0 all agents have symmetric information 
about what will happen in periods 1,2,3. Entrepreneurs invest in period 0 in skill 
development, which is specific to a particular kind of risky project and observable to 
financial market participants. The cost of generating this skill is )(zc . Entrepreneurs do 
not decide immediately on whether to invest in the risky project requiring the skill but 
they wait until a probability of success is privately revealed to them in period 1. The skill 
provides the entrepreneur with an option to invest in the risky project if the probability of 
success is above a threshold. They may also decide to stay with the safe project. The 
entrepreneur is remunerated through an equity stake in the project.  
            In period 1, the capital structure of the project gets determined. The capital 
structure is defined by the breakup of debt and equity. The bank holds the debt claim D , 
while the equity owners are the entrepreneur (insider) and the small shareholders 
(outsiders). Let the investment (loan) by the bank be denoted KII £, . The money put in 
by the equity holders is IK - .  Let r  be the opportunity cost of funds to the bank and q  
be the best alternative return to the small shareholders for their funds. Financial markets 
are imperfect in the sense that Modigliani-Miller conditions do not hold. In particular, the 
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cost of equity )(q  exceeds the banks’ opportunity cost of funds )(r , because, for 
example, issue costs of equity are higher than the costs to banks of issuing debt. 
Alternatively, the market for the firm’s equity is not liquid or informative. Under these 
conditions the entrepreneur always prefers to borrow from a bank. 
        The choice of projects, safe or risky, is determined in period 2. In this period, the 
entrepreneur draws the probability of success on the risky project, ,q  from a distribution 
)(qF .   The q  drawn by an entrepreneur is private information to the entrepreneur and is 
non-verifiable by the bank.  Thus the bank and the entrepreneur cannot sign a contract 
that is conditional on the realized q . The choice between the safe and the risky project by 
the entrepreneur is obviously, conditional on q . The bank, on the other hand, has 
committed to provide debt financing before the project risk is fully revealed.  
  In period 3 the project realizations are obtained and the claims settled.  If the safe 
project was chosen in period 2, the project realization is m  in period 3. If the risky 
project was chosen, and it was successful, the realization is z+m ; if unsuccessful, the 
return is .b-m  
We give the following interpretation to the risky technology.  Its outcome is 
dependent on two things --- the skill level z  which is specific to the risky technology, 
and q , which is the success probability attached to the risk undertaken by the 
entrepreneur.  While there is a positive gain of z  should the project be a success, the cost 
of the risky technology is the loss in asset value, ,0>b  should the project be 
unsuccessful.  In other words, the period 2 use of the specific skill by the entrepreneur 
reduces the future value of the asset. Successful completion of the project is sufficient to 
recover this asset degradation and improve on the total by .z  The asset degradation in 
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case of failure, b , is independent of the managerial skill, z . Therefore, managerial 
entrenchment is not present as it is in Bebchuk and Picker (1993), but our results are not 
substantially affected by this assumption as we will discuss later. 
For efficiency, the choice of the project in period 2 must be such that the expected 
return is maximized. An entrepreneur, with specific skill z  who has drawn a particular q  
will make an efficient choice of the risky project if she chooses the risky project only 
when 
.))(1()( mmqmq ³--++ bz  
The left hand side of the expression is the expected return on the risky project while the 
right hand side is the return on the safe project. Define 
(1) 
zb
b
+
º*q  
At *q , the last inequality holds as equality. Also, the inequality holds strictly for all 
*qq >  and is violated for all *qq < . Thus efficiency demands that risky projects be 
chosen for all *qq ³ . 
Throughout the paper, we will use the following assumptions: 
A.1: 0(.)'',0(.)' >> cc  for all 0>z  and .0)0( =c  
A.2: qK³m  
A.3: .0 m£< b  
A.4: .0>> rq  
A.5: q  is distributed between ]1,0[  and )(qF  is twice differentiable for ).1,0(Îq  
A.6: All agents are risk-neutral, while banks are competitive and give limited liability 
loans.  The equity market is competitive.  There is no strategic default by  
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entrepreneurs. 
A.1 postulates an increasing and convex cost function for the generation of specific skill. 
A.2 guarantees that entrepreneurs have economically viable projects. A.3 ensures that, 
given A.2 and equation (1), there will always be some threshold value of the probability 
of success on the risky projects, such that, all risky projects with a higher probability of 
success than this threshold are more profitable than the safe project.  Alternatively, A.3 
implies that *q  is well defined.  A.4 simply states that the equity cost of funds is higher 
than the bank’s opportunity cost of funds, implying that debt is always a desirable source 
of funds.  A.5 is a technical assumption implying a differentiable density function.  Most 
known distribution functions will satisfy the assumption, including the uniform 
distribution.  A.6 implies that banks do not earn excess profits, and that the supply of 
equity capital from outside shareholders is infinitely elastic at a price q .  No strategic 
default implies that entrepreneurs pay their debt claims whenever they can. 
 
3. Model Results with Fixed Skill 
In this section we assume that the skill level, z , of the entrepreneur is given.  We are, 
therefore looking at the problem from period 1 onwards.  Later, we will investigate the 
choice of this skill, which is determined in period 0.   
The debt contract is signed in period 1 and settled in period 3.  Let D  be the debt 
claim.  The bank's payoff in period 3, ,Bp  is a variable depending on the choice of the 
project and the realization on the risky project.  Observe that, from A.6, default occurs 
only when project realizations are insufficient to meet the claim D .  In a standard debt 
contract the bank will extract the full value of the realization, as long as the amount is 
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less than D .  This is usually effected through the transfer of ownership rights from the 
shareholders to the bank in the event of a default. This transfer occurs through the 
institutions governing bankruptcy procedures.  If there are no transaction costs during this 
transfer of ownership, and/or the bankruptcy courts strictly adhere to the absolute priority 
rule (APR), we have the standard debt contract (Gale and Hellwig, 1985). 
Suppose that bD ->> mm .  If the safe project is chosen there is no default.  If 
the risky project with probability q  is chosen, then with probability )1( q-  there will be 
default.  In that case, given A.6, the bank should be able to realize b-m .  Suppose 
instead, the bankruptcy institutions are costly and/or they do not strictly adhere to the 
APR.  Then the bank, in the event of a default will get less than b-m .  This can happen 
in two ways. First, since bankruptcy procedures are costly, the value left to be distributed 
between the bank and the shareholders, after the legal procedures, is only a fraction (less 
than one) of )( b-m .  This could result from the fact that, b-m , the value of a failed 
risky venture, is verifiable by the bankruptcy institution only at a cost.  Second, because 
the institutions may not adhere to the APR, the bank expects only a fraction of the true 
remaining value. In general, then the bank gets ),( bx -m  10 ££ x .  The bank when 
evaluating the debt claim will take into account the nature of the bankruptcy institutions 
as they affect the payoffs in the event of a default.  
For our purposes, however, we will consider deviations from APR as the primary 
reason for the bank getting less than the full liquidation value. Later, we will discuss what 
happens when bankruptcy institutions extract part of this value. In the event of default 
then, the shareholders obtain ).)(1( bx -- m  Observe that, given that there is no strategic 
default, such considerations are irrelevant when bD -£ m .   
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An entrepreneur chooses projects depending on q .  Since the bankruptcy 
institutions need not enforce the APR, it is possible for the shareholders (including the 
entrepreneur) to extract a positive value even when there is a default.  Let ,0, >bb  be 
the proportion of the project owned by the entrepreneur.  If the risky project is chosen, 
and ,bD ->> mm  then, it must be the case that 
(2)  
zbxD
bxD
DbxDz
+----
----
³Þ
-³---+-+
))(1(
))(1(
)()])(1)(1()([
mm
mm
q
mbmqmqb
                                       
Let 0q  be the value of the success probability such that the entrepreneur is indifferent 
between her risky project and the safe project. Then, clearly, all risky projects with 
,0qq ³  but with the same debt claim ,D  will be more profitable than the safe project.  
Those with 0qq <  will be less profitable than the safe project. In general,  
(3) 
ï
ï
î
ïï
í
ì
³-
->>ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+----
----
³>+
=
Dbif
bDif
zbxD
bxD
Dzif
mq
mm
mm
mm
mm
q
*
0 ))(1(
))(1(
,0max
0
 
If ,mm ³>+ Dz  the safe project gives a non-positive return, while the risky project 
gives a positive return with positive probability. This happens when the project is 
successful because z+m  is greater than .D  If ,bD -> m  there is always a positive 
probability that a risky project may fail and, hence, we have to take into account the 
bankruptcy institutions.   
The last line of (3) is the result of our assumption that there is no possibility of a 
strategic default on the safe project.  In other words, suppose that the entrepreneur has 
opted for a safe project and, ))(1( bxD --<- mm .  Here the entrepreneur has an 
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incentive to trigger a default even on the safe project.  Without default, the shareholders 
get D-m .  If, however, the entrepreneur defaults, and can hide the fact that a safe 
project was chosen, the shareholders will get ))(1( bx -- m .  If x  is small, such a 
possibility is always there.  In our model, we assume that such strategic defaults do not 
occur. 
 We can now write the period 1 expected value of a debt claim D .  The 
entrepreneur draws her q  after the debt claim is determined and at a time when all agents 
have symmetric information on )(qF  but do not know which q  will be drawn.  Also, 
since q  is either not observable by the bank, and/or unverifiable, the debt claim cannot 
be made contingent on .q  The bank knows that for all 0qq <  the entrepreneur will stick 
to the safe project and, choose the risky project otherwise.  To avoid having to use 
unnecessary algebra, we will assume that the bank never puts a debt claim that is more 
than what the risky entrepreneurs can pay even when they are successful, i.e., zD +£ m .  
This is not a restrictive assumption if we believe that entrepreneurs will not start up 
projects unless they make positive profits.  Any debt claim that takes away the entire 
return, even when projects are successful, will not encourage entrepreneurs to begin any 
project!  It has the added perverse effect of making a failed project more profitable to the 
entrepreneur as with 1<x , the entrepreneur can get a positive return on a failed project.  
 The expected payoff of the bank, ),(DE Bp  given zD +£ m  is: 
(4) 
ï
î
ï
í
ì
-£
->--++
= ò
bDifD
bDifdFbxDDF
DE B
m
mqmqqq
p
q
1
0
0
)()]()1([)(
)(  
Observe that, 
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(5) bDzifdFbxDDDE B ->>+----= ò mmqqmp q
1
0
)()1()]([)(  
All entrepreneurs, who draw ,0qq ³ will choose the risky project and the rest, 
will stay with the safe project. The measure of firms choosing the safe project is )( 0qF  
and that for risky project is )(1 0qF- . The bank’s expected return is given by the integral 
in the first line of equation (4).  If bD -£ m  then the bank gets paid even when a risky 
project has failed and the second line of (4) gives its return. 
 
Proposition 1:  Let z  and D  be given.  Under A.1-A.6, if bDz ->>+ mm , then there 
is more than efficient risk-taking, i.e., *0 qq < .  Also, ceteris paribus, 0q  is decreasing in 
D , for 00 >q . 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
  
 This Proposition states that a debt contract, regardless of the strictness of the 
bankruptcy rule, introduces an inefficiency --- the measure of firms undertaking the risk, 
)(1 0qF- , is strictly greater than the optimal amount, )(1
*qF- , for a given skill level.  
It is important to note that this is happening because of limited liability and not because 
of the bankruptcy environment.  From equation (3), if bD -£ m , the choice of risky 
projects is efficient.  For this range of values of the debt claim, there is no default, 
making limited liability irrelevant and, hence, produces no distortion in project choice. If 
bD -> m , there is positive probability of default on risky projects. Now, the presence of 
limited liability makes the entrepreneur’s payoff convex and, hence, she prefers more risk 
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at the margin. Shareholder value maximization is no longer the same as overall value 
maximization. 
Note however that, under a positive probability of default, the extent of the 
inefficiency is determined by the strictness of the bankruptcy rule.  Define the degree of 
inefficiency to be the gap between *q  and 0q .  If 0
* qq -  decreases, we say that the 
inefficiency has decreased. 
 
Proposition 2:  Let z and D  be given.  Under A.1-A.6, if bDz ->>+ mm , the degree 
of inefficiency (as measured by 0
* qq - ) falls as the strictness of the bankruptcy rule 
increases, i.e., as x  rises.  
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
 Limited liability makes bank payoffs concave and more risk taking implies a 
lower expected return for them. On the other hand, from Proposition 2 it appears that, a 
tightening of the bankruptcy rules can mitigate the inefficiency in risk taking. This should 
have a positive effect on bank returns. Our next Proposition is a formal statement of this 
result.  
 
Proposition 3:  Let z and D  be given.  Under A.1-A.6, if bDz ->>+ mm , the payoff 
to the bank increases as the strictness of the bankruptcy rule increases, i.e., as x  rises.  
Proof:  See Appendix. 
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Propositions 2 and 3 imply that a tightening of bankruptcy rules favors the bank.  
However, both these Propositions are true under a given debt claim. For a competitive 
bank, higher expected returns imply that its terms and conditions on the loans should 
change.  This will translate into different levels of exposure by the banks and, in 
particular, D  can no longer be given if we change x . We will now study the effects of 
changing bankruptcy rules. 
For non-trivial solutions that involve default possibilities, we will henceforth 
assume the following: 
A.7: )(DE Bp  is strictly concave in D .  Let 
*D  maximize )(DE Bp  in (4). Then, 
bD ->> mm * . 
This assumption performs two functions.  First, as stated earlier, it ensures that there is 
always a positive probability of default.  Second, it ensures that the safe project is a valid 
alternative.  If m³D , the safe project is never profitable.  Note that A.7 does not 
guarantee that 00 >q .  For that, we need 0))(1( >---- bxD mm , i.e., 
bxxD )1( -+< m .  
Given A.6, the entire value of the project is divided up between the bank and the 
shareholders.  Hence, the entrepreneur will want to pay the bank no more than what is 
necessary to make the bank invest.  Given A.4, the entrepreneur will want the bank to 
invest as much as possible, before going to the equity market.  For every D  the bank will 
invest I  such that rIDE B ³)(p .  Given competitive banks and that firms want banks to 
invest as much as possible, the maximum amount of bank investment *I  is obtained from  
(6) }
)(
,min{
*
*
r
DE
KI B
p
=  
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Observe that, rI  is the opportunity cost of the bank if it lends I .  Recall that K  was the 
funding required for projects to get started.  If rDE B /)(p  is no less than K , then the 
bank lends K  and, the equity market is never tapped by the entrepreneur since rq > . 
This makes the equity market irrelevant. To get non-trivial results, one must consider 
cases where the entrepreneurs access both the debt and equity markets. Entrepreneurs 
will access the equity market if 
A.8: KI <* . 
Under A.8, the firm is not fully financed by the bank. Here, credit rationing of individual 
projects is the result of the aggregate composition of risky to safe projects.  If banks 
could monitor the choice of projects, they could have announced a debt claim of rK  
against an investment of K  for at least those choosing the safe project.  This would have 
been efficient given A.2 and A.4.  Indeed, in our model, optimality demands that all 
project funding comes from the bank.  However, private information on risky projects 
encourages too much risk-taking behavior by entrepreneurs. The bank resorts to credit-
rationing to counter this. 
In certain ways, this sort of credit rationing is similar to that in Moore (1993).  In 
Moore, borrowers are capable of strategic default, since actual realization is private 
information to borrowers.  This requires lenders to commit to a verification cost 
whenever borrowers default.  This, in turn, increases the expected monitoring costs from 
a higher bank investment as the probability that returns are lower than the debt claim 
increases with higher debt claims.  There is, therefore, an optimal debt claim and 
associated with that, an optimal amount of bank financing of projects.  The logic of our 
argument is similar to that of Moore, though the structure is different.  The advantage of 
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the approach of Moore and that taken by us, is the endogenous choice of the debt claim 
and, hence, the capital structure of the firm.  
 A.8 has another important role in our model.  After our first Proposition, we 
argued that without a positive probability of default, there is no effect of limited liability 
on the efficient choice of risk.  A.4 implies that tapping the equity market is not efficient.  
If A.8 does not hold, then the project is completely debt financed.  The role of equity 
markets then becomes irrelevant to our analysis.  The inefficiency, if any, is the result of 
limited liability only.  With A.8, there is an additional distortion due to credit rationing 
and the consequent fact that entrepreneurs have to access the more costly equity market.  
Indeed, from Proposition 3 it follows that the possibility of credit rationing increases as 
the bankruptcy rule becomes less strict.  This is immediate from the fact that BEp , and 
hence )/( rE Bp , falls as x  decreases. 
  If A.8 holds, the project needs an additional amount IK - . The entrepreneur gets 
this from the equity market.  If the entrepreneur keeps b  proportion of the project for 
herself, the ownership of the outside shareholders, )1( b- , must be such that the 
outsiders are willing to invest.  In other words, if SEp  is the expected value to the 
outside shareholders, we must have 
(7) )()1( IKqE S -³- pb  
where, 
(8)
bDifdFbxDzFD
E S
->>---+-++-= ò mmqmqmqqm
p
q
1
0
0
)()])(1)(1()([)()(
 
 17 
For all entrepreneurs choosing the safe project, the return to equity is D-m , and this will 
happen with probability )( 0qF . This gives us the first term in the second line of (8). For 
0qq ³ , the entrepreneurs will choose the risky project. If successful, the equity holders 
will get Dz -+m ; if unsuccessful, they will get ))(1( bx -- m . These two returns will 
have to be weighted by their probabilities, for all entrepreneurs who draw a probability of 
success greater than, or equal to, 0q . This gives us the integral in (8). Equation (8) can be 
rewritten as 
(9) [ ]ò ---+++=
1
0
0
)()())(1()()(
q
pqmqmqqmp DEdFbzFE BS  
The value of the firm V  is the sum of SB EE pp + .  Thus, 
(10) [ ]ò --+++=
1
0
0
)())(1()()(
q
qmqmqqm dFbzFV  
A.6 guarantees that (7) will hold with equality, while A.2 and A.4 guarantee that 0>b , 
as long as there is a positive amount of investment by the bank.  Observe that, the value 
of the firm changes only when 0q  changes, when the value of z  is given.  
 
Proposition 4:  Let z be given.  Under A.1-A.7, if  00 =q , then there is no credit 
rationing. 
 Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
An increase in the debt claim increases the bank’s payoff if the composition of 
project choice does not change. From Proposition 1 we know that, for 00 >q , an increase 
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in the debt claim encourages some safe entrepreneurs to choose risky projects. This has a 
negative effect on bank returns as the aggregate default probability now increases and 
because there is limited liability. However, if 0q  is already at its lowest possible value, 
then an increased debt claim cannot change the aggregate composition of projects. Hence 
there is no negative effect from an increased debt claim on bank returns. The bank can, 
therefore, increase its debt claim. However, for competitive banks, an increased debt 
claim will have to be matched by an increased investment on the project, to ensure zero 
profit. What prevents the bank from increasing the debt claim must come from its 
inability to increase investment. This can happen only if investment is already at K , 
implying there is no credit rationing. This Proposition implies that credit rationing is 
always associated with 00 >q .  It is possible, however, that there is no credit rationing 
and 00 >q .  For the rest of the paper, we will consider the case when A.8 holds, i.e., 
there is credit rationing. 
 
Proposition 5:  Under A.1-A.8 and a given z , risk taking, i.e., the value of 0q , is 
independent of (small) changes in x , the degree of deviation from APR.  
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
An increase in x  implies a closer adherence to the APR. It also means that, 
ceteris paribus, BEp  increases for a given level of D .  As the steps in the proof of 
Proposition 5 show, a higher x  increases the maximizing value of the bank’s debt claim 
D . While the direct effect of x  is to increase 0q , the indirect effect, through an 
increased D  is to reduce it.  Proposition 5 argues that the two effects cancel out each 
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other in our model. This result is entirely different from the situation when D  is given.  
In Proposition 2 we had argued that if D , the bank’s debt claim, is fixed, then excessive 
risk taking is reduced as the strictness of the bankruptcy rule increases. In both cases, if 
there is credit rationing, banks will optimally respond to improved creditor friendly 
bankruptcy rules by releasing more credit.  
Bebchuk and Picker (1993) and Freirman and Viswanath (1994) argue in favor of 
a weakening of APRs in bankruptcy courts on the grounds that the over-investment in 
risky projects caused by limited liability would be reduced. In both papers the debt claim 
is fixed. Propositions 2 and 3 above based on the same assumption say that strict 
enforcement of APR reduces the over-investment in risky projects. Bebchuk and Picker’s 
result is explained by reduced managerial entrenchment through risky investments when 
management retains a share in a bankrupt firm’s assets. We have excluded managerial 
entrenchment by assuming that the loss of value of risky assets in bankruptcy, b , is 
independent of the return to investment in skills required by risky projects, z . Freirman 
and Viswanath’s result is explained by risk averse managers’ sharing of the downside 
risk when there are deviations from APR. Proposition 5 above, stating that risk-taking is 
independent of deviations from APR when the debt claim is endogenous, implies that the 
effects on risk-taking incentives of deviations from APR are offset by the banks’ 
rationing of debt to managers with strong incentives to take risk. This result is not 
affected by the assumption that there is no managerial entrenchment, i.e. that b  is 
independent of z . 
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Proposition 6:  Under A.1-A.8 and a given z , *I  increases for small increases in x , 
i.e., the extent of credit rationing is reduced when bankruptcy rules favors the bank more 
than the firm.  
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
 Equation (10) gives us the ex ante value of the firm. Observe that it is completely 
determined by the value of 0q , the threshold value of success probability beyond which 
entrepreneurs implement risky projects. Proposition 5 argues that this threshold 
probability is independent of changes in x , the strictness with which the APR is 
implemented. Thus, the value of the firm remains unchanged as we change the strictness 
of the bankruptcy rules.  
However, the varying degree of enforcement of the APR, changes the debt equity 
mix of the project. From our discussions we know that as x  increases, the expected value 
of debt increases, i.e., (.)BEp  goes up with x  (see the steps in the proof of Proposition 
6). Since the value of the firm stays the same (from Proposition 5 and equation (10)), the 
debt equity ratio (at market values) increases with x . According to the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem, the value of the firm is independent of the debt equity mix of the project. An 
important assumption there was that of perfect capital markets. With credit rationing, and 
rq > , we do not have perfect capital markets and, yet, the value of the firm is invariant 
to different debt-equity mixes triggered by the differing values of x . This is happening 
simply because in our model, the bank is free to choose both the debt claim and the 
amount of investment, as long as it ensures zero profit for itself. This reduces the need for 
outside equity as the bank increases its investment. Consequently, the manager’s share in 
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the firm, b , increases. With risk neutral agents, this implies that the enforcement pattern 
of the APR affects the distribution of surplus among the investors, but not the total 
surplus to be distributed.  
So far we have assumed that the skill level of managers is given. In the next 
section we will allow the skill level to be chosen by managers. We will show that a 
change in the value of x , or the strictness of the APR, has serious consequences for the 
levels of human capital, or skill, generated by managers.  
          Before finishing this section, we consider the ex ante effects of bankruptcy costs. 
So far we have been assuming that, in the event of default, the amount to be shared 
between the bank and the shareholders is b-m . If we introduce bankruptcy costs as a 
deadweight loss, a , then the amount to be shared between the bank and shareholders is 
bb -£<-- maam 0, . As the bankruptcy cost increases, both the bank and the 
shareholders lose. This implies that 0q  unambiguously goes up with the introduction of 
a .  
              We interpret a  as a transaction cost brought about by the bankruptcy institution. 
This cost does not affect the value of efficient risk-taking, which continues to be defined 
by equation (1). In this case the gap between *q  and 0q  decreases with a . The degree of 
excess risk-taking measured by 0
* qq -  is reduced. Ceteris paribus, an increase in a  
reduces the value of a risky project to both creditors and shareholders. The decline in the 
value from the entrepeneur’s point of view reduces incentives for risk-taking. As a 
consequence of this effect in isolation, the bank is willing to supply more debt and risk-
taking increases again. However, the bankruptcy cost reduces the value of the project to 
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the bank as well, and this effect reduces the supply of debt. The net effect is a reduction 
in risk-taking. 
    
4.  Endogenous Skill 
So far, we have taken the skill decisions in period 0 as given. We now solve for the 
optimal choice of skill as a function of the bankruptcy environment using the results 
derived above.  Rewriting (7) as an equality, and recalling that the entrepreneur owns a 
proportion b  of the project, the return to the entrepreneur, SEpb , is equal to 
)( IKqE S --p . We have also defined the value of the firm, V, as SB EE pp + . We can 
write 
(17) )( IKqEVE BS ---= ppb  
The period 0 expected return of the entrepreneur, W , is 
(18) )()()( zcIKqEVzcEW BS ----=-= ppb  
Using **)( rIDE B =p , we can write 
(19) )()( * zcIrqqKVW --+-=  
The following proposition is derived for the effect of closer adherence to APR on skill 
development in period 0: 
 
Proposition 7:  Under A.1 to A.8, entrepreneurial skill increases as the bankruptcy rule 
approaches APR i.e. as x  increases. 
Proof:  From Proposition 5, 0q  is invariant to changes in x . Hence, it is immediate from 
(10) that there is no change in the value of the firm, V . From (19), we have 
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(20) [ ]
x
I
rqIrqqKV
xx
W
d
d
d
d
d
d ** )()( -=-+-=  
which is positive from Proposition 6 and A.4. From A.1, it now follows that z  must 
increase with x . ¦  
 
As x  increases, the amount of bank investment increases. This reduces the 
amount of outside equity investment, which is a more costly source compared to the 
bank. The project, therefore, saves an amount )( rq -  for each unit of equity investment 
substituted for by bank credit. Since the market for outside equity is competitive, the 
entrepreneur extracts the entire additional value. This increases the return to managerial 
skill and, hence, encourages a greater investment in z . 
The result in Proposition 7 is in contradiction to, for example, Bebchuk and 
Picker (1993) and Berkovitch and Zender (1998), who argue that increased deviations 
from APR help induce managers and entrepreneurs to commit resources ex ante. There 
are two important properties in our model that causes this difference --- rq >  (A.4), and 
the fact that we allow for the endogenous determination of bank investment and debt 
claims. The other models share neither of these two properties. First observe that with 
rq = , 0=
x
W
d
d
 (equation (20)) and there is no effect on skill generation. Thus one does 
not obtain the results of Bebchuk-Picker and Berkovitch-Zender, if the capital structure 
of projects is endogenously determined in a credit rationed world. Second, the capital 
market imperfection of rq >  makes it all the more important for economic efficiency to 
have strict adherence to APR.  
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5.   Conclusions 
We have developed a model of an entrepreneur’s choice of risk-taking and managerial 
skill development in a model with endogenous credit rationing, caused by the bank’s 
inability to observe or to verify the entrepreneur’s risk-taking behavior after the loan has 
been granted. The only signal banks obtain, before loan decisions are made, about 
managers’ inclination to invest in risky projects is managers’ investments in skill 
development, which is required for risky projects.  
The result with respect to bankruptcy institutions and managerial skill 
development is that closer adherence to absolute priority (APR) tends to increase skill 
development, because credit rationing will be reduced for any level of skill. With respect 
to average risk-taking as reflected in the minimum probability of success inducing 
entrepreneurs to choose risky projects over safe ones, we find that risk-taking tends to be 
independent of deviations from APR. The reason is that closer adherence to APR on the 
one hand reduces incentives for risk-taking but, on the other hand, reduced credit 
rationing offsets this incentive-effect.  One common argument in favor of deviations from 
APR in the form of Chapter 11- type bankruptcy rules has been that such rules would 
enhance managers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific skills. It has also been argued that 
deviations from APR can reduce incentives for excessive risk-taking. Our results show 
that these incentive-based arguments do not hold if there is  credit rationing. 
Weak bankruptcy institutions characterize most emerging economies and many of 
them are trying to institute reforms of bankruptcy rules. An important element of 
financially reforming economies is the underdeveloped equity, or stock, market and, thus, 
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equity is, in general, more costly than bank debt. This paper suggests that such markets 
need to have strict adherence to APR if they want efficient investment and growth of 
entrepreneurial skill.   
Another implication of our analysis is that, if there is credit rationing, the capital 
structures of projects should be closely related to the strictness with which the bankruptcy 
institutions adhere to the APR. Credit rationing is, theoretically, a well-established 
outcome in markets characterized by limited liability and asymmetric information 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Moore, 1993). According to our model credit rationing will be 
more pronounced in economies with weak bankruptcy laws. Empirically, this should 
show up as lower debt equity ratios in economies with weak enforcement of bankruptcy 
rules, compared to those economies where there is strict adherence to bankruptcy 
procedures.4 
                                                
4 This argument presumes that banks in countries with different bankruptcy rules are not implicitly or explicitly 
protected against consequences of credit losses. It seems, however, that many countries with relatively debtor 
friendly bankruptcy rules also have banking systems that enforce debt contracts relatively weakly. See Wihlborg and 
Gangopadhyay (2001). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proposition 1:  Let z  and D  be given.  Under A.1-A.6, if bDz ->>+ mm , then there 
is more than efficient risk-taking, i.e., *0 qq < .  Also, ceteris paribus, 0q  is decreasing in 
D , for 00 >q . 
Proof:  In section 2 we had argued that efficiency demands that an entrepreneur chooses 
the risky project only if q  is no less than *)/( qº+ zbb . However, if *0 qq < , then the 
measure of q  over which the risky project is chosen increases.  Define  
[ ]))(1( bxDA ----º mm .  
Then, we can write 0q  as )/( zAA + . So, 
*
0 qq <  if and only if )/()/( zbbzAA +<+ , 
which is equivalent to )( bxD -> m . This is guaranteed by A.7, since 10 ££ x . The 
second part is immediate from differentiating )/( zAA +  with respect to D , keeping in 
mind that 00 ³q . ¦  
 
Proposition 2:  Let z and D  be given.  Under A.1-A.6, if bDz ->>+ mm , the degree 
of inefficiency (as measured by 0
* qq - ) falls as the strictness of the bankruptcy rule 
increases, i.e., as x  rises. 
Proof:  Observe that *q  is independent of x .  Hence, it is sufficient to check the 
movement of 0q .  
0
)(
)(
2
0 >
+
-
=÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
+
=
zA
bz
zA
A
xx
m
d
d
d
dq
.  We, therefore, have ( ) 00* <-qqd
d
x
 and this proves 
our result.  ¦  
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Proposition 3:  Let z and D  be given.  Under A.1-A.6, if bDz ->>+ mm , the payoff 
to the bank increases as the strictness of the bankruptcy rule increases, i.e., as x  rises.  
Proof:  For this we need to check the sign of 
x
E B
d
pd
 for given values of D .  From 
equation (5) in the text, 
[ ]ò ---+--=
1
0
000
0
)()1()()()1()(
q d
dq
qqmqqm
d
pd
x
fbxDdFb
x
E B , 
which is positive, given 00 >
xd
dq
 from Proposition 2.  ¦  
 
Proposition 4:  Let z be given.  Under A.1-A.7, if  00 =q , then there is no credit 
rationing. 
 Proof:  00 =q  implies that 0)1())(1( £--+=---- DbxxbxD mmm .  Also, 00 =q , 
implies from equation (5) in the text, 
0)1(1| 00 >--== qd
pd
q ED
E B .  The bank can increase its debt claim and improve its 
expected payoff.  However, since banks are competitive, this will automatically require a 
higher investment by the bank.  Thus, the only reason for the bank to continue with this 
D  is that it cannot increase its investment on the project.  This will happen only if 
KI =* .  ¦  
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Proposition 5:  Under A.1-A.8 and a given z , risk taking, i.e., the value of 0q , is 
independent of (small) changes in x , the degree of deviation from APR. 
Proof: Differentiating )(DE Bp  with respect to D , we get 
(10) 
ò ---+--=
1 0
00
0
)()1)](([)()1(1
)(
q d
dq
qqmqq
d
pd
D
fbxDdF
D
DE B
 
Define 
D
DE
N B
d
pd )(
º . Our assumptions guarantee that, at *D , 0=N , while strict 
concavity implies that 0
)(
2
2
<º
D
N
D
DE B
d
d
d
pd
.  Setting 0ºN  and totally differentiating, 
(11) x
x
N
D
D
N
Dx dd
d
d
d
d
dd )0()0( ||0 == +=  
From equation (3), given A.7, we have 
(12) ))(|()(
)(
| )0(
0
2)0(
0 b
D
b
zA
z
x xD
--=-
+
= == md
dq
m
d
dq
dd  
where ))(1( bxDA ----º mm . For ease in notation, write 211 NNN +-= , where 
ò -=
1
1
0
)()1(
q
qq dFN  and 
D
fbxDN
d
dq
qqm 0002 )()1)](([ ---= . From (10), 
(13) [ ] )0(021
0
0
00)0( |)()1(| == ÷÷
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ö
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---= xx D
NN
D
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D
N
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dq
dq
d
d
dq
qq
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d
,  
and 
(14) [ ] )0(021
0
0
00)0( |)()1)((| == ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-----= DD x
NN
D
fb
x
N
dd d
dq
dq
d
d
dq
qqm
d
d
. 
Observe that using (12) and (13) in (14), we get,  
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(15) 
D
Nb
x
N
d
dm
d
d )( --=  
Substituting (15) into (11), we have 
(15) 0>-= b
x
D
m
d
d
 
The total change in 0q  is through the direct effect of x  and the indirect effect through 
D . Thus, 
0000 =+=
x
D
Dxdx
d
d
d
d
dq
d
dqq
 
from (12) and (15). ¦  
 
Proposition 6:  Under A.1-A.8 and a given z , *I  increases for small increases in x , 
i.e., the extent of credit rationing is reduced when bankruptcy rules favors the bank more 
than the firm.  
Proof: From Proposition 2, we know that 0q  does not change with increases in x . Using 
the definition of )(DE Bp  from (4) and A.7,  
(16) 
x
D
D
DE
x
DE
dx
DdE BBB
d
d
d
pd
d
pdp )()()(
+=  
Recall that (16) has to be evaluated at *DD = , at which value of D  the bank’s revenue 
is maximized. From (4) and A.7, this implies that 0
)( *
=
D
DE B
d
pd
. Again, from (4) and 
A.7, 0
)( *
>
x
DE B
d
pd
. This proves the result, given (6) and A.8.  ¦  
